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TESTING MINIMALISM: A REPLY 
Cass R. Sunstein * 
Some judges are less ·ambitious than others; they have minimalist ten­
dencies. Minimalists are unambitious along two dimensions. First, they seek 
to rule narrowly rather than broadly. In a single case, they do not wish to 
resolve other, related problems that might have relevant differences. They 
are willing to live with the costs and burdens of uncertainty, which they tend 
to prefer to the risks of premature resolution of difficult issues.' Second, 
minimalists seek to rule shallowly rather than deeply, in the sense that they 
favor arguments that do not take a stand on the foundational debates in law 
and politics. They prefer incompletely theorized agreements, by which diverse 
people, from their different perspectives, can unite behind modest rather than 
immodest theorizing. 2 They believe that such agreements recognize the diffi­
culty of resolving foundational debates, and that they also allow people, 
including judges, to show one another a large measure of mutual respect. 
In p rominent cases, some judges favor minimalism, and others do not. 
Justice O'Connor, for example, has often shown a preference for case-by­
case judgments that leave the most difficult questions for another day.3 
Justice Scalia, by contrast, is no minimalist.4 He endorses an ambitious 
theory of constitutionalism-"originalism"-and he often uses that theory 
to decide cases.5 Much of the time, he prefers to rule broadly rather than 
narrowly, because of his preference for rule-bound judgments that give 
clear guidance for the future. Of course minimalism and maximalism 
should be seen as relative rather than absolute. Justice O'Connor is a 
minimalist, much of the time, but she does not always follow a minimalist 
path, and even when she does, she does not say that her rulings are limited 
to people with the same initials as the parties to the particular litigation. 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chi­
cago Law School and Department of Political Science. A.B. 1975, J.D. 1978, Harvard.-Ed. 
l. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 80 (2003): 
The pragmatic judge tends to favor narrow over broad grounds of decision in the early stages 
in the development of a legal doctrine .... What the judge has before him is the facts of the 
particular case, not the facts of future cases. He can try to imagine what those cases will be 
like, but the likelihood of error in such an imaginative projection is great. Working outward, in 
stages, from the facts before him to future cases with new facts that may suggest the desirabil­
ity of altering the contours of the applicable rules, the judge avoids premature generalization 
2. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1733 
( 1995). 
3. See, e.g. , Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 579-85 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring); 
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64--69 (1999) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736-38 ( 1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
4. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
5. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989). 
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Justice Scalia has maximalist tendencies, but he does not try, in a single 
equal protection case, to resolve all imaginable equal protection cases. 
I am extremely grateful to Neil Siegel for his generous and careful 
analysis of my claims about minimalism and the Supreme Court. 6 Siegel 
offers three objections to those claims. 7 First, he contends that minimalism 
has not been precisely defined, and that the presence of diverse and incon­
sistent definitions makes it difficult to test the claim that any particular 
court, or any particular decision, is minimalist in character. Second, Siegel 
claims that the most usable definition of minimalism is palpably inconsis­
tent with Court's behavior during the 2003 term (and probably more 
generally). Third, he contends that minimalism, suitably defined, is unattrac­
tive, among other things because it violates the Supreme Court's roles as 
guide and as guardian. These are instructive objections. But the disagree­
ment between Siegel and me is smaller (more minimal!) than it appears, and 
I hope that a few clarifying remarks will help to illuminate both the nature 
and the uses of the minimalist project. 
I. MINIMALISMS 
What is minimalism? Let us begin with three distinctions. First, proce­
dural minimalism entails an effort to limit the scope and ambition of judicial 
rulings; procedural minimalism should be distinguished from what I call 
minimalism 's substance, which entails an identifiable set of substantive 
commitments (to, for example, fair procedures and the rule of law). 8 Second, 
procedural minimalism as a general category should be distinguished from 
the subcategory of democracy-forcing minimalism, which involves an effort 
to issue narrow rulings that do not mandate ultimate outcomes but that force 
decisions by politically accountable actors. 9 The Court might, for example, 
refuse to resolve a hard constitutional problem and rule more narrowly that 
Congress must authorize an intrusion on constitutionally sensitive inter­
ests. 10 Third, denials of certiorari and justiciability doctrines, by which the 
Court refuses to reach the merits, should be distinguished from narrow and 
incompletely theorized judgments, by which the Court resolves the merits 
6. Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the 
Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1951 (2005). 
7. He focuses on CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, 
ONE CASE AT A TIME] and Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed, The Smallest Court in the Land, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 4, 2004, § 4 (Week in Review), at 9 [hereinafter Sunstein, The Smallest Court]. I discuss mini­
malism at various points in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREMIST RIGHT-WING 
COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (forthcoming 2005). 
8. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 7, at 61-68. In particular, see the sug­
gestion that it is ;;important to distinguish between minimalist procedure and minimalist substance:• 
Id. at 61. 
9. Id. at 24-36. 
10. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). 
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but without much foreclosing the future. 11 When the Court denies certiorari, 
or holds that a decision is unreviewable, it is adopting a form of procedural 
minimalism, but that form is importantly different from narrow and incom­
pletely theorized judgments. I hope that I made these distinctions adequately 
in earlier writings, but very possibly not; Siegel is certainly correct to insist 
on their importance. 
Siegel's principal concern, and mine as well, is procedural minimalism 
in the form of narrow and incompletely theorized rulings. Quoting from a 
2004 op-ed of mine, Siegel suggests that procedural minimalism requires 
courts to decide "the largest issues of the day . . . as narrowly as possible." 12 
Hence he offers a testable hypothesis, to the effect that a decision is mini­
malist if it involves an "intentional choice by a majority of the Justices . . .  
to decide a case on the narrowest and shallowest grounds reasonably open to 
them, even though broader and deeper rationale(s) were reasonably avail­
able." 13 
Siegel should certainly be commended for offering a testable hypothesis, 
as I did not. He is right to say that there is a great deal of room for empirical 
work on the Supreme Court's uses of minimalism. But I never meant to sug­
gest that members of the Court pursue minimalism with the intensity and 
rigor suggested by Siegel's hypothesis. To be sure, it is possible to imagine a 
set of judges, or perhaps even a court, taking the trouble to identify the pos­
sible rationales for certain decisions and consistently selecting the narrowest 
and less ambitious of these. But no real-world court is likely to act in this 
way; and for reasons that Siegel identifies, such a court would be nothing to 
celebrate, if only because it would give so little guidance for the future. A 
court of this kind would tum minimalism into a kind of dogma or theology. 
It would not use minimalism on the intensely pragmatic grounds that some-
• • 14 times support 1t. 
When I suggest that the current Supreme Court (often) favors proce­
dural minimalism, then, I mean to say only that in the most difficult and 
controversial domains, the Court tends to choose relatively narrow and 
unambitious grounds. 15 The Court has not accepted a large-scale theory 
of constitutional interpretation; it proceeds by building cautiously on 
precedent, in the fashion of common law courts. Unfortunately, my 
claim-that minimalists prefer relatively narrow and unambitious 
11. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 7, at 39-41. 
12. Siegel, supra note 6, at 1954 (quoting Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 7). 
13. Siegel, supra note 6, at 1963. 
14. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 7, at 46--60. Note, in the spirit of 
Siegel's critique, that a decision that is both wide and deep might also leave many issues undecided. 
Consider, for example, a decision to the effect that people have a constitutional right, on autonomy 
grounds, to avoid "undue burdens" on their medical choices. Courts that leave things undecided 
after broad and ambitious rulings should not be treated as minimalist. 
15. Siegel identifies this possibility. Siegel, supra note 6, at 2016. He adds that the sugges­
tion that the Court favors "reiatively narrow and shallow holdings" is "less clearly inaccurate," and 
notes that this claim could be tested empirically. Id. at 2019. I agree. 
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grounds-is not entirely easy to test empirically. To test that claim, it 
would be necessary to identify a large number of cases, to specify the 
possible grounds for decision, and to see how often the Court selected 
narrower grounds in the face of competing possibilities. It would also be 
necessary to specify what counts as minimalism along all relevant di­
mensions, and to decide how to count a decision in which minimalism 
along one dimension (say, avoiding the merits) produces maximalism 
along another dimension (say, through a wide ruling on standing). A 
great deal of coding would be necessary by people with internal under­
standing of the relevant cases. Notwithstanding the difficulties, there is a 
great deal of room for empirical testing of minimalism. In the absence of 
empirical work, I can suggest only that in many of the most prominent 
cases in recent years, the Court has rejected both width and depth. Siegel 
himself offers a number of examples. 16 
II. MINIMALISM FALSIFIED? 
As I have said, Siegel understands minimalism in absolute rather 
than relative terms, as involving an intentional decision "to decide a case 
on the narrowest and shallowest grounds reasonably open to" the Court. 17 
He explores a number of decisions from the October 2003 term to see 
whether the Court was minimalist in that sense. He finds that if this is the 
right account of minimalism, the Court has not consistently followed it. 
Consider a few examples. In Blakely v. Washington,18 the Court did 
refuse to decide the validity of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but 
that should be unsurprising; what matters is that the Court could have 
ruled on the Sixth Amendment question in a way that was more narrowly 
limited to the facts. In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,19 the 
Court left many issues undecided and generally avoided width, but it did 
not rule on the narrowest possible grounds, especially in its expansive 
understanding of "corruption" in politics.20 Siegel agrees that the Court 
pursued a fairly minimalist path in Locke v. Dave/1 and Tennessee v. 
Lane,22 though more in the latter case than in the former.23 But he does 
not find minimalism in two of the Court's most eagerly awaited deci­
sions, Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow24 and Rumsfeld v. 
16. See Siegel, supra note 6, at 1978-82; see also SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra 
note 7, at 76-205. 
17. Siegel, supra note 6, at 1963. 
18. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
19. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
20. Id. at 223-24. 
2 1. 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
22. 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
23. Siegel, supra note 6, at 1978, 1980. 
24. 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
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Padilla.25 He acknowledges that Newdow, refusing to resolve the constitu­
tionality of the Pledge of Allegiance, was in a sense minimalist,26 but he 
thinks that Padilla, involving a merits-avoiding procedural ground, an­
nounced a broad (procedural) rule with large implications for other 
• 27 issues. 
In a series of instructive discussions, Siegel convincingly shows that, in 
a number of cases in the 2003 term, the Court did not rule in the narrowest 
imaginable way. But is that big news? Let us identify a continuum of possi­
ble outcomes, from a denial of certiorari, to a refusal to reach the merits, to 
a fact-bound decision that goes barely beyond the immediate parties, to a 
decision that states an identifiable if narrow rule with an identifiable if shal­
low rationale, to a decision that offers an identifiable but broad rule, and so 
on, culminating in a truly maximalist (if also unfathomable) decision that 
resolves all questions for all time by reference to the most fundamental of 
principles. Focusing on the 2003 term, Siegel makes a special target of my 
2004 op-ed, which, to be sure, does not analyze minimalism in much detail. 
But the essential claims in that little op-ed may nonetheless hold. In New­
dow, the Court did refuse to assess the Pledge of Allegiance on the merits. 
In Padilla, the Court did refuse to rule on the merits of an exceptionally con­
troversial issue of presidential authority; the same is true of the Cheney 
case.28 In cases involving sexually explicit materiai29 and enemy combat­
ants,30 the Court did say more than was strictly speaking "necessary," but it 
also showed a tendency toward both narrowness and shallowness insofar as 
it deliberately refused to resolve some of the key questions raised by the 
litigants. 31 
Siegel's most interesting point, it seems to me, is that a decision that is 
minimalist along one dimension may be wide or deep on another. If a court 
invokes a procedural ground to avoid the merits, that very ground might be 
ambitiously reasoned or apply to a wide range of problems not before the 
Court. Siegel is right to emphasize this possibility. He is also right to iden­
tify many ways during the 2003 term in which the Court failed to choose the 
narrowest possible rationale for its decision. But I wonder if that is the ap­
propriate test of the minimalist hypothesis. Notwithstanding a regrettably 
loose phrase in an op-ed ("as narrowly as possible"), those who find strong 
minimalist tendencies in the Supreme Court are inclined to think that Siegel 
may have mounted an attack, illuminating to be sure, on a strawman. 
25. 542 U.S. 426 (2004). The case is discussed in Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 
2004 SUP. Cr. REV. 47. 
26. Siegel, supra note 6, at 1982. 
27. Id. at 1985. 
28. Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004). 
29. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
30. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
31. For detailed discussion, see Sunstein, supra note 25. 
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III. Is MINIMALISM BAD? 
Siegel dislikes minimalism; he believes that it is normatively unattrac­
tive, because it leaves so much uncertainty. He emphasizes that "often it is 
critical that the Court provide guidance, either to the lower courts or to the 
political process."32 Objecting to the uncertainty introduced by Rasul v. 
Bush,33 Newdow,34 and Lane,35 he thinks that the Court should try to provide 
clear rules for others, so as to reduce aggregate decision costs. Siegel fears 
that minimalist decisions often leave important problems to lower courts, 
not to citizens and their representatives, and to that extent such decisions do 
not promote democratic goals. He believes that the Supreme Court is a 
guardian as well as a guide, and he insists that it is appropriate for constitu­
tional theory to specify the areas in which ambitious rulings are justified, 
even when those rulings reject the outcomes of political processes. 
I am not sure how much Siegel and I disagree on the normative ques­
tions. I have not argued, and I do not believe, that minimalism is generally 
or always the right path.36 When planning is important, minimalism is haz­
ardous; when minimalism imposes high decisional burdens on others, the 
argument for minimalism is weakened. Hence minimalism must be evalu­
ated in terms that have become familiar from the rules-standards debate in 
many domains of the law.37 If it is desirable for the Supreme Court to leave 
decisions to lower courts, it is partly because lower court decisions are less 
final, and a degree of percolation can occur there at the same time that de­
liberative debate takes place within the citizenry as a whole. In the end 
Siegel and I agree that the argument for minimalism is strongest in an iden­
tifiable class of cases: those in which American society is morally divided, 
those in which the Court is not confident that it knows the right answer, and 
those in which the citizenry is likely to profit from more sustained debate 
and reflection.38 
If Siegel and I have a normative disagreement, it is because he is more 
confident than I am about what he calls "the Supreme Court's role-and 
comparative advantage-in our constitutional system of separate but interre­
lated powers."39 Invoking Brown v. Board of Education,4-0 which he labels 
"heroic," 41 he emphasizes that as compared to other institutions, "the Justices 
32. Siegel, supra note 6, at 2003. 
33. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
34. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
35. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
36. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 7, at 54-60. 
37. See id. at 57-60. 
38. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 7, at 59, 257-58; Siegel, supra note 6, at 
2016. 
39. Siegel, supra note 6, at 2015. 
40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
41. Siegel, supra note 6, at 20 15. 
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are more insulated from the pressures of majoritarian politics and therefore 
better equipped to protect minority rights. "42 This is of course a plausible 
and time-honored view, defended in whole or in part by the early Bickel, 43 
Dworkin, 44 and Ely.45 Certainly it is easy to find cases in which the Court's 
insulation served the nation well. But if we are going to celebrate Brown,46 
we had better not forget about Dred Scott v. Sandfor£1 or Lochner v. New 
York48 or Coppage v. Kansas49 --or, for that matter, United States v. Morri­
son,50 Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents," City of Boerne v. Flores,52 Board 
of Trustees of the Univ ersity of Alabama v. Garrett,53 Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena,54 and Gratz v. Bollinger.55 The Court's conception of what prin­
ciple requires, and its understanding of what it means to defend "minority 
rights, " should not be taken as unerring. From the moral point of view, insu­
lation from majoritarian pressures is sometimes the problem, not the 
solution. 
But good minimalists do not mean to attack the structure of judicial re­
view. They mean to insist instead on Learned Hand's suggestion, in the 
midst of World War II, that "[t]he spirit of liberty is that spirit which is not 
too sure that it is right . . . . "56 In many of its best moments, the Rehnquist 
Court has respected that spirit, not least in decisions involving free speech, 57 
sex equality, 58 the war on terrorism, 59 and even federalism. 60 In its own small 
way, minimalism can be heroic too. 
42. Id. 
43. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
44. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986). 
45. JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
46. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
47. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
48. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
49. 236 U.S. 1 (1915). 
50. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
51. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
52. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
53. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
54. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
55. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
56. LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND AD­
DRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189, 190 (Irving Dillard ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1952). 
57. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 518 
U.S. 727 (1996). 
58. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
59. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
60. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Solid Waste Agency v. United 
States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
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